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Academic reports of"The 2017 Annual Academic Forum of Economics and Management — Presentation Series (9)"

Sourse: College of Economics and Management  Date:2017-06-20

(1) Title: Research on Revenue Sharing Bargaining and Behavioral Selection Strategies of an ESCO Based on the Robustness of Shared Savings Contract

Speaker: PhD. Dong Qian        Time: 15:00-16:00 pm, June 23, 2017

Venue: Meeting Room C304, The Building of Economics, Management and Landscape Architecture

Abstract: The ESCO and the EU sigh the basic revenue sharing contract through the contract period and the revenue share negotiation based on the expected annual project energy savings, and share energy-saving revenue on schedule according to the contract after the success of putting the project into operation. An EPCP value (expressed in energy-saving revenue) is uncertain affected by energy price volatility and unexpected events shock. Based on the robustness of shared savings contract, the paper assumes the project value obeys geometric Brownian motion with Poisson jump, and combined with Rubinstein model to construct the basic shared savings contract bargaining model of an EPCP under the project value uncertainty, which overcomes the drawback of previous EPCP revenue sharing negotiations researches that they assumed the project value is certain. Then derives and provides the equilibrium ESCO’s revenue-sharing bargaining strategies in the different contract periods. The results show that the number of negotiation rounds, the risk-adjusted discount rate, the probability of accidents and the project value decline proportion when the accident occurs have the positive impacts on the equilibrium strategies, the round discount factor and the growth expectation of energy price have negative effects. However, the factors of the researches under the certain project value are only the number of negotiation rounds, the round discount factor and the discount rate of the project value. According to the reality that the  annual energy savings is decided by these two factors, the paper  draws the forecast–commitment contract designed by Durango-Cohen and Yano (2006), in which a retailer and a manufacturer make forecasts and commitments for the same single product, to build the forecast-commitment contract model of an EPCP, where the ESCO makes the forecast and the commitment on the product’s energy savings and the EU makes the product yield in a single phase (i.e., gives expectation and minimum commitment), and the party must pay compensation when he cannot reach the promised value. Then deduces the optimal product’s energy savings commitment of the ESCO. Considering the success of putting the project into operation depends on the complementary efforts of the two parties after signing the contract, the paper builds a double-sided moral hazard model to analyze and provide the optimal behavior selections of the parties under the equilibrium revenue-sharing bargaining strategies. The results show that the probability of success of putting the project into operation under asymmetric information is less than the probability under symmetric information; the efforts of the parties are both increase with the increase of their own revenue share, decrease with the increase of Opponent’s revenue share, and decrease with the effort cost factors of their both, these reflect the complementary characteristic of their efforts.

(2) Title: Social Network, Extension Service and Farmers' Water-saving Irrigation Technology adoption

Speaker: Qiao Dan (A PhD Candidate)

Time: June 23, 2017 (Friday)          16:00-17:00pm

Abstract: Social network and extension service are two main channels for farmers to obtain technical information in modern agricultural production. Social network emphasizes the interaction of the actors in the use of social relations to carry out technical information communication and interaction with the outside, and extension service emphasizes the government's intervention, control and institutionalization of the farmers' technology adoption. There may be a complex relationship between government promotion organizations and social network. In the past studies, there are neglects about the interaction between social networks and extension services. This study is intended to be based on the use of different technology adoption phase, such as decision-making, adoption process and adoption effects from the perspective of extension services and social networks, mainly answering the following questions: Under the technology promotion system in China, how can farmers obtain technical information through social networks and extension services? What are the impacts of social network and extension services on farmers’ different water-saving irrigation technology adoption process? Can the government promote the promotion of technology promotion by using the social network of farmers? How should we design a government extension service model that incorporates farmers’ social network?

Welcome the related professional teachers or graduate students to take part in the forum.

College of Economics and Management
June 20, 2017